with economists of Fu Dan University.
In addition, we visited an arts and crafts workshop, a cotton textile factory, a machine tool plant, a rural people's commune, a grocery supermarket, a large department store, an industrial exposition, a high school, and a hospital. We found all of these visits and discussions extremely informative. Nevertheless we are acutely aware of the vast gaps in our information about the Chinese economic system.
Very few macro-economic data were available to us, and we were not able to talk to economists and other responsible officials in the planning and operating agencies of the government.
In this report I have tried to summarize my impressions. They are personal ones, which my travelling companions may not share. Moreover, I am fully aware of the extraordinary margins of uncertainty which surround them, particularly the numerical speculations I have attempted.
To write about so large and complex a subject on such short and fragmentary acquaintance is certainly presumptuous. It is justified only by the tremendous interest and ignorance in the West concerning a country with which we have had so little contact for a quarter of a century.
CHINA'S G.N.P.
There really is no information on Chinese national accounts.
Indeed, as orthodox Marxists, the Chinese do not recognize bourgeois national accounting concepts. They subscribe to a materialist definition of national output and regard the provision of services as "unproductive" activity.
Figures are scanty even for their definition.
Nevertheless I have thought it a worthwhile exercise of imagination to try to construct some plausible, consistent, primitive national accounts from the hints and scraps of data we were able to pick up. Needless to say, the standard errors of these guesses are vast, but the numbers may be indicative of orders of magnitude. One purpose of the exercise is to see how it is possible to reconcile the evidence that labour productivity is 7 to 8 rimes as high in industry as in agriculture with indications that industrial wage incomes are only 3-4 times as high as agricultural earnings.
First, as to population and labour force, I begin with the U.N. estimate of 1971 population, 773 million. The U.N. derives this by extrapolation from the 1953 census and from provincial reports in the late 1960s. These indicate a rate of increase of 1.8% per year, a figure that accords with information we were given about the population growth of provinces, cities , and communes we visited. I have no information on labour force participation, or even on the age distribution of the population. One may assume a high participation rate because it is customary for women to work both in city and country, and because neither tradition nor life expectancy (50 years according to the U.N.) suggests that there are many retired people. _Arbitrarily, I
have taken the labour force to be 500 million.
Second, I have divided the labour force among producing sectors. A relatively solid fact is that 80% of the population live in the countryside.
I have set the agricultural fraction of the labour force somewhat lower, 75%.
Birthrates are higher in rural areas, so the rural population contains relatively more young children. "" Moreover, although schooling is still less in the country than in the city, the regime has made great strides in universalizing six years of primary education, and in some regions a full eight years of schooling. Another consideration is that the rural population is not exclusively engaged in agriculture. Many communes operate small factories; the one we visited near Shanghai made light bulbs. In addition, the communes encourage and organize peasant handicrafts, traditional and modern. These enterprises absorb labour in slack agricultural periods and are a good source of supplementary cash income.
. The other 25% of the labour force cannot be fully assigned to industry, because a substantial number are occupied in service trades, general government, and the armed forces. According to materialist economic accounting, these latter activities are "unproductive". With no statistics to support or contradict me, I have placed 15% of the labour force in industry and 10% in services and government.
Third, a figure of U.S.$90 billion was floating around as an estimate of China's GNP for 1970 or 1971. I was told this by the "principal responsible person" of the Institute of Economics, and he indicated that it came from an interview of Chou-en-lai with a foreign journalist, probably Edgar Snow. My informant could not or would not give details. I assume that the figure covers only value added in "productive" activities and that it is an estimate of such output at market prices, if one may use that term, rather than at factor prices. That is, I assume that value added includes the indirect taxes paid to the state as well as wages and profits.
There are at least two further difficulties of interpretation.
One arises from the dual system of agricultural prices to which I will return later in this report. We were told that the "disparity" had been reduced 40% by government effort since liberation.
As for industry, I would guess that the state takes fifty per cent of industrial output, possibly more. In the first place, there are heavy turnover taxes on gross value of production. The textile factory we visited paid 18% in taxes, the machine tool factory 5%. Our informants agreed that the tax rate is generally higher for consumer goods than for capital goods.
In any case, turnover taxes, levied on total value of output including costs of materials, pyramid into substantial rates on gross value added, the concept used in GNP estimates. In the second place, a substantial fraction of depreciation charges are commandeered by the state. The textile enterprise, for example, retained discretion over only half of its replacement allowances.
In the third place, industrial enterprises seem to make large net profits, which are turned over to the state in full. The textile factory reported its profit as 19% of the value of its output. The machine tool factory would not say, but it must have been large given that their payroll and turnover tax together accounted for only 10% of the value of their shipments and that their profits were said to be ten times the amount of their gross investments--and this in an expanding industry with high priority in the plan.
My guess of 50% plus is consistent with information given us that 90 of state revenues come from state enterprises, the remaining 10% from agricultural communes, collectives in the service trades, and miscellaneous sources.
From the estimated $36 billion of value added in agriculture, the 6% turnover tax must yield more than from $2 to $3 billion, to which must be added taxes from some other non-industrial sources. It is not unreasonable to guess that industry provides the state with more than $27 billion (nine times $3 billion)
half the estimated industrial output of $54 billion. I guess that the state collects a total of $32 billion in taxes and in profits and replacement allowances of state enterprises.
Of course a substantial part of the state's take from industry is returned in investment appropriations. But industry also pays for "non-productive" investments-housing, hospitals, roads, sewers, etc.--and for some appropriations of investment funds to agriculture.
In addition to taxes and profits, the state through its People's directly half of its depreciation charges. These facts lead to the guess that investments through the budget and the Bank are less than $20 billion-I have written $17 billion in the Table. The remaining state outlays, guessed at $12 billion for consistency, cover administration, defence, education, medical care, public sanitation and health, and so on.
Finally, to complete the imaginative tableau requires some numbers for the so-called "unproductive" sectors, for which we have even fewer statistical clues than for industry and agriculture. I guessed above that 10% of the labour force might be engaged in service and governmental activities.
Some of these workers are in modern employment where they earn wages at least comparable to industrial wages: civil servants, teachers, bus drivers, medical workers, department store clerks, etc. Their average productivity--measured in terms of value of output at market prices-is, however, perhaps only half that in industry, since in these activities the mark-ups for taxes and profits are much smaller. Many other workers in these sectors are closer to agricultural workers in their productivity and earnings. They use technology equally as primitive. Most local transportation, for example, is powered by back-breaking human effort. The streets are full of old men and women conveying incredibly heavy loads by pulling two-wheeled carts, or slowly pumping pedal-cabs or tricycle pick-ups, or simply piling cargo on their backs or their bicycles.
If I attribute to the 50 million workers I have assigned to the service sector an average productivity one-third of that in industry, I should add $12 billion to the materialist GNP of $90 billion.
In addition, I should make some other bourgeois imputations, in particular rents for the homes people occupy. Only nominal rents are charged by the state, surely no more than costs of upkeep. The same principle applies to hospital beds, another facility whose use is priced in a market economy but virtually free in China. I have quite arbitrarily placed the value of such imputations at $10 billion, or $13 a year per person. This is probably conservative; the implied proportion of consumer income devoted to housing is low compared to other countries. It is also obvious even to the casual sightseer that the quality of the housing is very poor; this is clearly one of China's biggest economic challenges.
All these guesses are summarized in Tables I and II For most countries, a principal feature of economic development is the transfer of population from countryside to city, from agriculture to industry and commerce. This is an important source of growth, because labour productivity is much higher in industry than in agriculture. Moreover, the process raises labour productivity in agriculture as well. In many developing countries, high wages and glittering city lights attract hordes from the countryside to take their chances on a scarce supply of urban jobs. In these countries the cities are crowded with people unemployed or unproductively occupied in nuisance jobs on the fringes of urban society. Their housing is squalid, and they overwhelm the capacities of municipal services, as the incidence of begging and crime attests.
China is not undergoing economic development in this sense, and by the same token is not suffering from the social problems that accompany it.
There is no unemployment in China. The Chinese proudly make this claim, and Factories and urban employers do recruit in the countryside when the planning authorities have licensed them to add to their work force.
They go to the country "middle schools", junior and senior high schools, in search of promising and interested talent. But my impression is that they do so only when they have exhausted the supply of school-leavers within their city itself.
As a result of this policy, the relative distribution of population between countryside and city has remained stable, with roughly 80% of the population rural. Since the rate of natural increase is higher for the rural population, stability implies some industrial and urban recruitment of rural youth. But the classic process of development by shift of labour
force has yet to begin. China has not succeeded in expanding the number of urban jobs much faster than the natural increase of urban population itself.
The happy consequence of strict central control of the labour market is that Chinese cities do not exhibit the distressing urban pathologies from which so many cities elsewhere suffer, and for which some Chinese cities were notorious before the revolution. There are no beggars in the streets, no idlers on the corners, no derelicts without beds or roofs, no 
THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNES.
The Chinese countryside is organized into people's communes, which are geographical and administrative sub-divisions of government as well as economic units for agricultural, and some non-agricultural, production.
The communes vary in size from 5 ,000 to 4-0,000 persons. They are in turn divided into production brigades of roughly 1,000 members, and these in turn into production teams of 150-200 members. The team is the basic unit of production, responsible for cultivating its assigned land and for allocating and organizing the work of its members. A part of the proceeds of each team is appropriated by the brigade and the commune for local public services, administrative costs, welfare benefits, and investments. These levies are of the order of 10-15%. In addition, there is the 6% state tax previously referred to. The brigades and communes own certain equipmenttractors, threshers, transplanters. Teams are charged rent for their use.
After all these charges are met, the remainder is available for distribution to the nembers of the team, although the team itself may decide to appropriate some for collective purposes.
Distribution among team
members follows what the Chinese described as the socialist principle of remuneration: "to each according to his work". Specifically, each member accumulates work points each day he works, up to a maximum of 13 per day.
Distributions are in proportion to accumulated points. These are meant to reflect strength, skill, diligence, and "attitude" Each peasant suggests his own score, and his suggestion usually prevails without dissent. Sometimes his colleagues argue that his score should be higher. Less frequently,
we were told, they try to persuade him it should be lower. It was hard to pin down how decisions are made in these cases, but we were told that it was done by "democratic centralism".
In the commune we visited near Shanghai, the average daily score was said to be about 11.
The teams, brigades, and communes also operate their own social security systems. The sick, disabled, and elderly are first of all the responsibility of their kinfoik, by eternal tradition. But in case of need, they become a collective responsibility.
Evidently the process of organizing the entire countryside into teams, brigades, and communes was largely accomplished during the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. But it is not yet complete in all areas of the country, for it is not yet known in Peking, at least by our informants, how many communes there are altogether and how many people are members.
Peasants in communes are allowed small plots for personal gardens and, in the commune we saw, may keep two pigs. Private output is meant for personal consumption, not for sale, certainly not for sale in the city. But the regime is anxiously conscious of what are termed the "spontaneous forces"
of the rural economy, by which I understood the instinct of peasants for private trading and arbitrage. The concerns expressed on this count suggest that private sales may be more frequent than anyone cares to admit.
Normally, the commune keeps what it wants for internal consumption and sells the rest to the state for distribution to factories or retail outlets.
There is discretion here as long as the delivery targets specified in the plan are met. A grocery store we visited in Peking maintained direct telephonic contact day and night with neighbouring communes, to order deliveries of fresh vegetables and fruits. In the case of grain crops--the only foodstuffs rationed in China are grain and vegetable oil-the commune is expected to limit its internal consumption and sell the excess, no matter how much it is over-achieving its "tasks", to the state. At first our queries about seasonal fluctuations in prices of fresh produce were met with insistent denials that even these occurred, but The same observation may also apply to another major crop, cotton, because cotton cloth is also rationed.
The other factor is that most of China's consumers are peasants who can find a way to consume whatever supplies of many products are not purchased for urban consumption. If they have a big harvest of apples and prices are held stable or reduced insufficiently to attract extra urban consumption to match, the peasants can simply eat the apples or preserve them. If the apple harvest is poor, while urban demand stays high, the peasants will simply have fewer apples to consume or preserve.
The elasticity of their demand with available supplies provides a buffer that makes controlled prices workable. This is possible in China because agricultural markets are local and segmented, not of national scope. Every city is served mainly by a surrounding hinterland of diversified agriculture, and only to a minor degree by shipments from distant regions specialized in particular crops.
INCOME DIFFERENCES.
In the commune we visited, the strongest and best workers earned perhaps 40% more than the weaker members.
In the textile factory the lowest wage was 35 yuan per month, the average was 60; the highest wage for workers was a bit more than 100; engineers and technicians earned 130-140. One of the aims of the anti-elitist anti-intellectual Cultural Revolution was to narrow income differentials, especially those that gave educated people superior status to workers and peasants. We were given to understand that the high wages paid to older engineers, doctors, craftsmen, and professors are obsolete vestiges of the past, maintained for present incumbents out of humanity and charity but certainly not anticipated for their successors.
At the hospital, for example, it was implied that the current generation of physicians, properly inculcated and motivated by
Maoist thought, would not expect to advance much beyond 100.
China really is at the beginning of an experiment to see if nonpecuniary incentives can be substituted for substantial income differences as inducements for high quality professional, scientific, and administrative performance.
Of course the chances of success are facilitated by the state's control of job allocations and the denial of free choice of jobs and occupations. Once a university student, for example, chooses his field of study, he has in effect lost control of his career.
The engineering student will go where he is assigned, just like an officer newly graduated from a military academy.
In conversation with our Chinese companions, I was surprised at how easily and cheerfully they accepted this fact of their lives, and how little value they placed on the freedom of choice they lack. One after another simply said, "I go where the state needs me most". But the high morale inspired by a strong sense of national duty will also have to be sustained to make the experiment a success.
ECONOMICS IN CHINA.
Our contacts were confined to university economists at Peking The university cannot, it is said, divorce itself from the politics of the country.
2) Students and teachers must not set themselves apart from or above workers and peasants. Students will not be admitted until they have two years of practical manual work in farm or factory. Moreover, students must spend a third of every academic year in such work. Teachers and staff must spend at least one month in this way. Intellectuals must learn from workers and peasants, and their aim must be to serve the masses.
3) Subjects must be taught and learned in ways that combine theory and practice.
Economists and physicists must learn by doing in factories, not just by abstract study. Mao has told social scientists that the whole society is their laboratory. He was not talking about sample surveys. The message is to get outside the cloistered walls and learn by getting your hands dirty.
4) The length of courses of study has been cut, generally to three years after high school even for professionals like physicians and engineers.
Further specialized knowledge is to be learned on the job. "The job", however, can include research assistantships for apprentice academics and scientists.
5) The university is supposed to be less hierarchical and authoritarian in structure than in the old days. The precept applies both within the faculty and between faculty and students. Faculty ranks are being phased out. No more professors are to be appointed. Young teachers and students are to have more say in running the university. Classes are to be conducted with give-and-take between students and teachers. Marks, tests, and cramming are now de-emphasized. Since students are carefully selected, with attitude and political reliability as important as intellectual promise, they are to be treated as mature co-workers, not as recalcitrants in need of discipline or of threats of flunking out.
These last strands of reform sound like academic revolutions in the 1960s all over the world. But I found the general anti-intellectualism and political dogmatism of the university reforms frightening.
I cannot be optimistic about Chinese universities in general, or in particular about economics as a scientific discipline in China. Although we engaged in much brave talk about exchanges of academicians and scientists, I
am afraid it will be some time before we talk the same language in economics, and even longer before "a hundred flowers" are allowed once more to bloom in Chinese universities. The Academy of Sciences may be more promising since it is a research institution not involved in the delicate matter of shaping young minds. But at the moment the Academy too is just getting organized after a period of confusion and soul-searching.
Whether these developments in academia are any long-run threat to the Chinese economy is another matter. One has the impression that the Chinese have been consuming intellectual and professional capital since 1965
and are still doing so. But in spite of our own occupational prejudices as academicians, the kind of capital they are consuming may not contribute much to GNP, on either socialist or bourgeois definition. Meanwhile the Chinese are stressing the universalization of primary and secondary education.
It too is strongly ideological, but the new generation will be literate as well as Maoist. Since one cannot escape the impression that the Chinese are a very able and industrious people, who were kept in misery and ignorance by centuries of misrule and more recently by a century of foreign exploitation, stable government and elementary literacy may set the stage for remarkable progress for several decades to come.
